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Evidence-Party's Testimony
As Judicial Admission
WHERE A PARTY concedes in his pleadings or by express stipulation
in court the truth of some alleged fact, is action amounts to a judicial
admission which operates as a waiver of proof, thereby removing the
proposition in question from the field of disputed issue
The purpose of this artide is to examine the extent and merits of
the corollary that testimony of a party which is adverse to his own interests also operates as a judicial adrmission, thereby condusively establishing the truth of the matter asserted and removing the issue from the
province of the jury.
Where a party unequivocally testifies to a fact injurious to his own
cause and no other evidence is offered to contradict his own unfavorable
testimony, he is generally held bound by hIs statemnent.2 But where a
party testifies adversely to hIs own interest and is contradicted by other
evidence, either in the form of his own inconsistent testimony or that of
other witnesses, 3 the courts are not in agreement as to whether and in
what instances such testimony has the force of a conclusive judicial admission.
It is frequently declared, by way of dicta, that a party's self-injuring
testimony always concludes him on that point.' And, indeed, all junsdictions undoubtedly recognize that the adverse testimony of a party, although contradicted by other evidence, may operate as a judicial admission. However, an examination of the cases indicates that this result is
limited in most jurisdictions to situations where the party deliberately
and unequivocally concedes a fact which is within his own peculiar knowledge. The rule is not invoked where the party testifies equivocally, or
'9 WGMORE, EVIDENcE 586

(3d ed. 1940).

'Broad River Co. v. Middleby, 194 Fed. 817 (4th Cir. 1912); Gray v. Pankey, 211
Ala. 539, 100 So. 880 (1924); Perry v. Hanover, 314 Mass. 167, 50 N.E.2d 41
(1943); Folan v. Price, 293 Mass. 76, 199 N.E. 320 (1936); Roddy Co. v. Dixon,
21 Tenn. App. 81, 105 S.W.2d 513 (1937); Daugherty v. Lady, 73 S.W 837 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1903)
'Some jurisdictions apparently require that the contradicting evidence be other than
the party's own inconsistent testimony in order to avoid the effect of a judicial ad-

mission. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Lusk, 37 Ga. App. 99, 139 S.E. 89 (1927); Casey
v. Northern P. Ry., 60 Mont. 56, 198 Pac. 141 (1921); Fowler v. Pleasant Valley
Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594 (1898)
'Van Meter v. Zumwalt, 35 Idaho 235, 206 Pac. 507 (1922); Feary v. Metro. Street
Ry., 162 Mo. 75, 62 S.W 452 (1901); Hodges v. Ettinger 127 Ohio St. 460, 189
N.E. 113 (1934); Southern Surety Co. v. Inabnt, 1 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Vellines, 162 Va. 671, 175 S.E. 35 (1934); Massie
v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922)
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to a matter of estimate or opinion, or merely as an observer of an objective occurrence wherein he might honestly be mistaken.5
In considering what the effect of a party's adverse testimony should
be, in Hill v. West End St. Ry. the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reasoned:
There is no sound reason why the familiar doctrine that a party may

contradict, though not impeach, his own witness, should not, if the c;rcumstances are consistent with honesty and good faith (italics supplied), be

applied when he is himself the witness.

In other words the law recog-

nt2es the fact that parties, as well as other witnesses, may honestly mistake
the truth, and requires juries to find the facts by weighing all the testimony,
whatever may be its source."

Endorsing this principle, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has
stated:
It appears
that among the circumstances which should be considered are the following: (1) Was the party at the time when the occurrence
about which he testified took place, and when he testified, in full possession
of his mental faculties? (2) Was his intelligence and command of English such that he fully understood the purport of the questions and his

answers thereto?

(3) What was the nature of the facts to which he testi-

fied? Was he simply giving his impressions of an event as a participant or
an observer, or was he testifying to facts peculiarly within his own knowledge? (4) Is his testimony contradicted by that of other witnesses? (5) Is
the effect of his testimony dear and unequivocal, or are his statements inconsistent and conflicting?

Where a party's self-injurious testimony concerns his description of
the details of an objective occurrence in which he participated or which
he observed, most courts have recognized the fact that he may honestly
be mistaken in his observation. His testimony, therefore, is not held to
be conclusively binding. Thus, in McHardy v. Standard Oil Co.,8 the
plaintiff testified that she saw the defendant's truck parked in a position
facing her when she came over the crest of a hill a quarter of a mile
away, and that it remained in that position as she traveled the intervening
distance. The occupants of a car traveling in the same direction as the
truck testified that the truck stopped suddenly, forcing the driver of their
car to swerve into the path of the plaintiff's car at a point near the
truck. The testimony of the plaintiff, if taken as true, would dearly
establish that the parking of the truck for such a substantial period of
time prior to the collision was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The court held that the plaintiff was not bound by her testimony since
it consisted of a narrative of events which she observed, about which she
'See 20 AM. JUsR. 1032 and Note, 169 A.LR. 798 (1947).
'158 Mass. 458, 459, 33 N.E. 582 (1893)
'Harlow v. Ladair, 82 N.H. 506, 512, 136 At. 128, 131 (1927).
'231 Minn. 493, 44 N.W.2d 90 (1950).
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might honestly be mistaken. On the same ground, a party's contradicted
testimony on the question of whether a train was in motion,9 whether
a car was starting,'" stopping" or at rest, 2 whether a railroad apron
lurched right or left,1 3 whether a car was traveling upon the right or left
side of the road,' 4 whether the party had stepped forward' 5 and whether
a control button had been inadvertently depressed, 6 have all been held
not conclusively binding.
However, a significant minority of the jurisdictions have held a party
bound by his description of an objective occurrence. Thus, in Mollman
v. St. Lowas Pub. Service Co.,' the question was whether the driver of the
taxicab in which the plaintiff was riding negligently injured her by
swerving into the path of a streetcar closely approaching from the rear
and by stopping suddenly. The plaintiff testified that the taxicab traveled
over the streetcar tracks for the distance of a city block, was gradually
brought to a stop at a traffic light and was struck from the rear after
being at a standstill for an appreciable length of time. The streetcar
motorman testified contrarily. The court held the plaintiff conclusively
bound by her testimony and reversed a lower court decision in favor of
the plaintiff.'
Another instance where the courts often rule that the self-injurious
testimony of a party does not constitute a judicial admission is the situation where the party s testimony is in the nature of an opinion or estimate regarding certain facts of the case. In King v. Spencer," in holding
that the defendant's testimony to the effect that his brakes were bad and
that if he had had good brakes he could have avoided the collision did
not conclusively bind him, the Connecticut Supreme Court said:
Where also the testimony of a party
is in the nature of an estimate
or opinion as to which he may honestly be mistaken, he does not unequivocally concede that the fact is in accord with the opinion expressed, and
there is no injustice in permitting the court to consider the other evidence
in the case, and determine from all the evidence what the actual facts are."

On this basis it was held that a father's testimony that his son's earnings were not sufficient to pay for his board and clothing, being in the
nature of an opinion or conclusion, did not bind him. 2 ' And a plaintiff's
statement to the effect that his fall into a coal-hole was due to his own
lack of care was held not to bind hin. 22 Similarly, parties' testimonial
statements concerning their health, 23 sobriety24 and the proximate cause
of injuries 25 have been held not binding. Estimates as to time, speed and
distances, matters of judgment about which a party is as prone to err as
any other witness, furnish frequent occasion to relieve against the con2
clusive effect of a judicial admission.
But, on the theory that a party cannot honestly be mistaken as to
subjective facts such as his intent, feeling or knowledge at a certain time,
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some of the courts which hold that a party's adverse testimony does not
always conclude him have held that testimony concermng such matters
27
does have the effect of a judicial admission. In McFaden v. Nordblom,
in holding the plaintiff bound by her testimony as to her feelings and
intentions regarding a settlement agreement, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court declared:
A plaintiff might honestly be mistaken in his narration of the physical
facts constituting his cause of action and may properly ask a jury to find as
true the facts as set forth in the testimony of the other witnesses. But he
has no such right to ask the jury to disbelieve his testimony concerning his
knowledge, motives, purposes, emotions or feelings -matters concerning
which he alone can have any personal expetience or information and upon
which he should be able to speak with reasonable assurance of the truth u

A few jurisdictions have held that a party is always bound by his ad'Bond v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 110 Mo. App. 131, 84 S.W 124 (1904).
" Hill v. West End St. Ry., 158 Mass. 458, 33 N.E. 582 (1893).
'Whteacre v. Boston Elevated Ry., 241 Mass. 163, 134 N.E. 640 (1922)
'Alamo v. Del Rosario, 69 App. D.C. 47, 98 F.2d 328 (1938).
'Watkins v. Boston &M. R.R., 83 N.H. 10, 138 Atl. 315 (1927)
1
Ross v. Burnham, 91 N.H. 80, 13 A.2d 733 (1940).
" Mathis v. Tutweiler, 295 Fed. 661 (6th Cir. 1924)
"lIsabelle v. Crystal Laundry, 93 N.H. 264, 41 A.2d 241 (1945).
I 192 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1946)
IsCf. Stearns v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 566, 148 N.W 128 (1914);
McCoy v. Home Oil & Gas Co., 60 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. App. 1933); Miller v. Stevens,
63 S.D. 10, 256 N.W 152 (1934); Stark v. Hubbard, 187 Va. 820, 48 S.E.2d 216
(1948). New Hampshire cases have held, mistakenly it seems, that a party's testimony as to his own movements and actions is a "subjective matter," discussed infra.
Sarkise v. Boston & M. R.R., 88 N.H. 178, 186 Ad. 332 (1936). In Morris v. Boston & M. R.R., 85 N.H. 265, 160 Atl. 52 (1932), the plaintiff testified that he
stopped his car on the railroad tracks. Four eye-witnesses testified that a locomotive
hit the car as it was moving across the tracks. The court declared: "Whether or not
the car came to a stop was a fact peculiarly within the plaintiff's knowledge."
' 115 Conn. 201, 161 Ad. 103 (1932)
IId.at 205, 161 Atl. at 105.
I State exrel. Fleckenstein v. District Ct., 134 Minn. 324, 159 N.W 755 (1916).
=Sheffield v. Chicago, 328 IM.App. 321, 65 N.E.2d 486 (1946)
' Pullman Co. v. Tuetschman, 169 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1948).
'McLean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951)
'Leonard v. Manchester, 96 N.H. 115, 70 A.2d 915 (1950)
'Gulf, M. & 0. R. v. Williamson, 191 F.2d 887 (8th Cit. 1951); Hansberger
Motor Transp. Co. v. Pate, 51 Ga. App. 877, 181 S.E. 796 (1935); Davis v. Kansas
City Pub. Service Co., 361 Mo. 168, 233 S.W.2d 669 (1950); Lamontagne v. Canadian Nat. Ry., 97 N.H. 6, 79 A.2d 835 (1951); Bird v. Long Island R.R., 11 App.
Div. 134, 42 N.Y. Supp. 888 (1896); Clayton v. Taylor, 193 Va. 555, 69 S.E.2d
424 (1952).
307 Mass. 574, 30 N.E.2d 852 (1940').
Id. at 575, 30 N.E.2d at 853.
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verse testimony, regardless of the nature of the facts to which he is testifying, unless the court allows him to subsequently change his testimony
under a claim of confusion, mistake or lack of definite recollection. 29
Frequently such a rule is announced in a case, only to be later distinguished on the basis that the testimony therein was uncontradicted or
related to subjective facts.
In Ohio, it is not clear what the rule is regarding the effect of a
party's adverse testimony. In the case of Pope v. Mudge,30 the first Ohio
Supreme Court case to consider the matter, the plaintiff's claim was based
on the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendants
upon which the plaintiff relied to his detriment. The plaintiff at one
point in his testimony (in a deposition) categorically denied that he believed the misrepresentations made to him. The court held that the admission did not conclusively bind him and that the jury could consider
the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff at the time of the
statement and the other contradictory testimony and conduct of the plaintiff and of other witnesses in determining whether the plaintiff was deceived by the misrepresentations.
In the recent case of Winkler v. Columbus,31 holding the plaintiff
conclusively bound by an admission which she made on cross-examination
to the effect that she knew and realized at the time of the accident that
the sidewalk upon which she fell was in a defective condition, the Ohio
Supreme Court said:
The Court of Appeals assumed that because plaintiff testififed one way
in chief and contrarily on cross-examination, the case should be left to the
jury to choose between her conflicting statements. That would be proper
in the case of an ordinary witness, but where the testimony involved is that
of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's testimony whether in chief or cross-examination, discloses negligence on the part of plaintiff contributing directly
to her injury the fact has been settled and the matter becomes a question of
law to be determined by the court. "

Thus, the court's latest pronouncement, apparently, is that the adverse
testimony of a party always operates as a judicial admission. However,
the Winkler case is doubtful authority for such a sweeping rule. In the
first place, the court did not expressly overrule the Pope case, but merely
limited it to its peculiar facts. Furthermore, the character of the plain'Stearns v. Chicago, R.I. & P R.R., 166 Iowa 566, 148 N.W 128 (1914); Steele
v. Kansas City Ry., 265 Mo. 97, 175 S.W 177 (1915); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D.
10, 256 N.W 152 (1934); McMath Co. v. Staten, 42 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) However, Missouri and Texas except estimates and opinions from the operation of this rule. Haddow v. St. Louis Pub. Service Co., 38 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. App.
1931); Quanah, A. & P Ry. v. Bone, 208 S.W 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
'0 108 Ohio St. 192, 140 N.E. 501 (1923).
149 Ohio St. 39, 77 N.E.2d 461 (1948)
"Id. at 44, 77 N.E.2d at 464.

